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Response to Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement
of General Principles on the Duties of
Partners Withdrawing from Law Firms
Leslie D. Corwin*
L Introduction
I respectfully submit that no topic is more volatile and important to
partners and to the modem-day law firm than the duties of partners withdraw-
ing from law firms. I applaud the Washington and Lee School of Law and in
particular, Professor Vestal, Professor Sundby, and Dean Sullivan for sponsor-
ing such a visionary program as the Withdrawals and Expulsions from Law
Firms Symposium. I also applaud the law students that participated in this
symposium. I strongly believe that establishing programs that mentor law
students on the legal and ethical issues that arise while practicing is an obliga-
tion of both the law schools and of the profession. We need more programs
like this one so as to expose law students to the human side of law firm
practice.
An interesting thing happened to me between the time I committed to be
a participant in the symposium and my appearance at Washington and Lee -
I became a withdrawing partner. I could not think of a better way to prepare
to comment on the presentation of my esteemed colleague, Robert Hillman.
I decided that I had to experience firsthand that which I had been litigating,
writing, advising, and lecturing about in order to truly do justice to Professor
Hillman. I decided actually to live through the experience of withdrawing
from a law firm and to apply the principles set forth in Professor Hillman's
presentation. No matter who you are, change is one of the most difficult
things that any human being can go through, and I am now at the top of the
list. My change took place in March of 1998. I say this because in order to
truly comprehend the multifaceted framework thatProfessor-Hillman outlined,
* Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig Hoffnan Lipoff Rosen & Quentel, New York; co-
author of LESLIE D. CoRwIN & ARTHUR J. CIAMPI, LAW FiRM PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
(1998). This paper was presented at a symposium sponsored by the Washington and Lee
University School of Law on April 16-17, 1998.
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we must never lose sight of the fact that the person or persons for whom these
principles and duties are established are going through a psychologically-
charged life experience. This is true regardless of their stature within the
profession or their status within the law firm from which they are withdraw-
ing. Furthermore, one cannot truly predict how one's colleagues at the firm
will react to an event that can properly be characterized as one of abandon-
ment and rejection.
I left Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein, LLP, the law firm that I
helped found fourteen years ago, to join Greenberg Traurig Hoffnan Lipoff
Rosen & Quentel, one of the fastest growing national law firms. Greenberg
Traurig solicited me through a legal recruiter. I left with clients and with
matters pending in various jurisdictions. I withdrew pursuant to a written
partnership agreement that I helped draft and that contained a sixty-day notice
provision. I immediately resigned as a member of the firm's Executive Com-
mittee and as co-head of the firm's Litigation Department. I took client files
and staff with me, and I continue to work on major matters for clients that I
actively solicited while at my prior firm.
The legal profession has changed drastically in the past decade. I call
this the age of attorney mobility. With so many lawyers moving laterally and
with law firms operating more and more like big businesses that are ever
mindful of the bottom line and of the generation of profits, it was inevitable
that our profession would rely more and more upon building from without by
bringing in lateral partners or by merging practices to provide growth and to
increase profitability. During the current decade, the increasing number of
mergers and dissolutions of law firms, the opening of more branch offices by
the national firms, and the growing competition for business have led to
record numbers of lawyers leaving firms, both voluntarily and involuntarily.
This rush of activity indicated to me that more and more law firms are expand-
ing in order to take advantage of the strong legal economy. I am happy to
report that these are good times for the legal profession. I believe that in this
age of mobility with its grass-is-greener mentality, it is more important than
ever for partners and their law firms to understand the legal and ethical issues
raised by partner departures and withdrawals. In order to promote such under-
standing, a statement of principles must be established. No one could have
done a better job than Professor Hillman did in establishing these principles.
I applaud and endorse his paper.
As America has changed, so has the legal profession. In this age of free
agency in which star athletes will leave for more money, in which entire
franchises will abandon cities, and in which instant gratification brought on
by a winning team is everything, nothing is sacred. Should we be surprised
then that these values have spread to the bar? Not at all. The reality is that
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we are an ego-driven profession, and a lawyer with portable business or a law
firm with solid recession-resistant practice areas like mergers and acquisitions
or intellectual property will seek greener pastures as readily as a star athlete..
For evidence of this tendency, one need only consider some of the household
names that have left us: Lord, Day, & Lord; Shea & Gould; Schatz & Schatz;
Ribicoff& Kotkin; Mudge Rose Guthrie & Alexander; and Gaston & Snow.
I have traveled to cities around the country consulting with law firms that
were bastions of stability and professionalism when I entered the profession.
I have been on both sides of partner departures and have represented law
firms, individuals, and groups. I have also been involved in law firm mergers.
Indeed, I just completed a merger during the last quarter of 1997 and have
started the process on another this month. I have overseen reorganizations,
restructurings, and liquidations and have tried cases relating to partner depar-
tures. When I entered this profession twenty-five years ago, these things were
nonexistent. I have encountered Professor DeMott's partners, Amy, Bruce,
and Charles, in my travels.'
A law firm consists of professionals, but in order to survive today, it must
be run like a business. In addition, a law firm must strictly adhere to the ethi-
cal guidelines and disciplinary rules that have been established for our profes-
sion. Finally, there must be compatibility both professionally and personally
between lawyers.
It should come as no surprise that turf wars have become more common
and also nastier because partners that leave firms often try to lure clients away
when they leave or when they are thinking of leaving. Thus, there has been
a significant amount of litigation surrounding partner departures. In fact, the
courts have recognized that "[f]aw firms are under siege."' This environment
has forced the courts to develop broad guidelines concerning the standards
and obligations of departing partners and the firms they are leaving. Now,
Professor Hillman has presented an actual set of principles.
A departing partner is required to act as a fiduciary with respect to his
soon-to-be-former partners and not to take unfair advantage ofthem.3 In other
words, the playing field must be level. This is true not only for issues of
1. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Faces ofLoyalty: A Comment on Hillman,
Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General Principles on the Duties of Partners Withdrawing
from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1041 (1998) (providing hypothetical situations of
lawyers leaving law firms involving partners named Amy, Bruce, and Charles).
2. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 151 (N.J. 1992) (quoting
ROBERTW. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF GRABBING AND LEAVING
3 (1990)).
3. See Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1264 (Mass. 1989) (stating that
departing partners have fiduciary obligations).
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accounting, but also for the manner and timing of notification of firm clients.
In searching for the "standard for general guidelines as to what partners are
entitled to expect from each other concerning theirjoint clients on the division
of the practice," Informal Opinion 1457 of the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility is an appropriate declaration of the ethical stan-
dards of attorneys announcing a change in professional association
One of the issues of greatest import is whether departing partners may
solicit clients for their new firm. In these situations, the principles governing
a fiduciary relationship between the firm and the withdrawing partner are
applicable.5 If the partner who is leaving has not yet informed the firm of his
resignation, the courts have determined that the answer to the above question
is a resounding "no." As stated by New York's highest court:
[A]s a matter of principle, preresignation surreptitious "solicitation" offrm
clients for a partner's personal gain.., is actionable. Such conduct ex-
ceeds what is necessary to protect the important value of client freedom of
choice in legal representation, and thoroughly undermines another impor-
tant value -the loyalty owed partners (including law partners), which dis-
tinguishes partnerships (including law partnerships) from bazaars.6
The issues raised in a case of a departing partner may focus on whether
there is (1) a breach of fiduciary duty when a withdrawing partner, prior to
announcing his resignation, solicits firm clients, (2) a contractual requirement
among partners requiring an attorney to try to integrate or institutionalize
clients into the firm that is legally enforceable, and (3) a cause of action for
fraud when an allegation is made that a promisor, at the time of making
certain representations, lacked any intention to perform.7 Although the
judiciary has not fully addressed these issues, the courts have offered some
guidance on the issue of informing the client about an attorney's departure so
that the client can make an informed choice either to stay with the firm or to
move on with the partner who is leaving
Clearly, the fiduciary obligations between partners and their firms exist
even as their relationship is coming to an end and in some instances, even
4. Id. at 1265 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1457 (1980) (allowing lawyers to provide information to clients stating newly changed
associations in letter format and delineating appropriate content of such letters)). See generally
Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42 (Ct. App. 1979) (discussing standards and requirements
of notice to firm clients when partner withdraws in order for withdrawing partner to avoid future
liability for firm's actions).
5. See Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1193
(N.Y. 1995) (setting forth parameters of fiduciary duties regarding solicitation of clients).
6. Id. at 1183.
7. Id. at 1182.
8. Id. at 1182-84.
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afterwards. With this in mind, both departing partners and the law firm must
avoid acting out of pure self-interest and must remember that, as partners, they
are guided by this "punctilio of an honor the most sensitive" until the bitter
end.9 Under the law, partners have the right to withdraw, although they may
not do so free from obligation." In some respects, voluntary or involuntary
withdrawal is similar to retirement, death, or disability. Like retirements,
withdrawals may be friendly. Like involuntary terminations, withdrawals may
be acrimonious.
It is crucial for partnerships to analyze and prepare for the economic and
professional impact of changes in the relationship of partners. Given the
impact of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it is essential in today's
climate that the firm's partnership agreement address the law regarding the
relationship between partners and the law firm. Outright restrictions in the
partnership agreement on the right of a withdrawing partner to practice law,
such as a noncompetition procedure and an agreement not to solicit firm
clients, are prohibited unless they are made within the context of retirement
and the receipt of benefits." The general principals discussed above apply
whether the law firm is a partnership, a professional corporation, a limited
liability company, or some other variation.
I. Forfeiture for Competition: Noncompete Clauses
The ethical rules are clear - clients have the right to choose or to change
their counsel, and it is improper for any lawyer to enter into an agreement that
restricts his or any other lawyer's right to practice. 2 Both the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-108 and Rule 5.6 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the American Bar Associa-
9. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
10. See Hinshaw v. Wright, 412 S.E.2d 138, 144 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
withdrawing partner breached his fiduciary duty to remaining partners by purposely failing to
deliver important insurance papers in timely fashion).
11. See MODELCoDEoFPRoFEssIoNALREsPONslBILrrYDR2-108(a) (1980) ("Alawyer
shall not... restrict[ ] the right of a lawyer to practice law... except as a condition to payment
of retirement benefits.").
12. See generally Howard v. Babcock, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 690 (Ct. App.), superseded
inpart, 832 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1992), affid in part, rev'dinpart, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993) (finding
agreement limiting withdrawing partners' rights to practice invalid as violation of public
policy); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 155 (N.J. 1992) (finding one-
year restriction on withdrawing partner's practice of law for firm client impermissible); Denburg
v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 998 (N.Y. 1993) (finding financial
disincentives against competition in practice of law invalid because provisions restrict client's
choice of counsel); Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (finding agree-
ment precluding payment of withdrawing partner's interest in firm if partner resumed practice
of law in violation of Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-108(a)).
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tion in 1983, provide that a partnership or employment agreement that "re-
stricts the rights of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relation-
ship created by the agreement" is improper.' In addition, both rules provide
that no such restriction may be imposed as part of a settlement of a contro-
versy between the partnership and a departing or withdrawing partner. 4 Thus,
even if a law firm's partnership agreement has such a clause, one cannot rely
upon it being enforced.
As Professor Hillman noted in his presentation on notification and
solicitation of clients, it is well-settled that noncompete clauses are unenforce-
able. 5 The reason for this rule is that you cannot restrict the rights of attor-
neys to practice law and to service clients because that would constitute a
restriction on the client's right to counsel of his choice. In addition to my
counseling of lawyers, I lecture extensively to accountants and investment
bankers, two professions that have had restrictive covenant clauses upheld
continually by the courts.' 6 When I bring this issue to their attention, the first
thing I hear is "there go those lawyers protecting themselves again." I believe,
however, that the answer I give them is logical and something to which they
can relate. I tell them that the United States Constitution and, specifically, the
Bill of Rights, offer everyone a sacred right - the right to counsel of his own
choice. I also tell them that this right is fundamental to our rich heritage and
is the reason why courts have protected and will continue to protect the right
of a client to stay with counsel of his choice when a partner departs. Indeed,
it is why courts have overwhelmingly refused to enforce those provisions in
partnership agreements that restrict the practice of law through financial
disincentives to the withdrawing partner and why it is easier today for a
partner to withdraw from a law firm than from any other professional service
firm or practice. 7
In the leading case of Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord," New York's highest
court invalidated a provision in a law firm's partnership agreement that
13. MODEL CODEOFPROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILTY DR2-108(1980); see MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1997) (prohibiting use of agreement that "restricts the
right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship").
14. See MODEL CODEOFPROFEsIONALRESPONsIBILTrrY DR 2-108 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1997).
15. Robert W. Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General Principles on the
Duties of Partners Withdrawing from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 997, 1014 (1998).
16. See, e.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. Galasso, 538 N.Y.S.2d 424,427-29 (Sup. Ct. 1989)
(acknowledging validity of restrictive covenant against accounting firm).
17. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MoBiLiTY 2:47 (1998) ("The pro-
hibition against anticompetition clauses sets lawyers apart from members ofother professions.").
18. 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989).
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deprived a partner, who was moving from one Wall Street firm to another, of
the net profits and legal fees earned prior to and subsequent to his departure. 9
An Oregon Court of Appeals case, Gray v. Martin,° served as precedent for
Cohen.2' In Gray, the court prohibited a law firm from depriving a withdraw-
ing partner, who was competing with his former firm, of a percentage of
profits otherwise payable to a departing partner who had no intention of
continuing to practice law.'
Recently, an Illinois Appellate Court in Stevens v. Rooks Pitts and
Poust' and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Pettingell v.
Morrison, Mahoney & Miller24 ruled that a law firm cannot withhold income
from a partner who leaves the firm and then practices law in the same geo-
graphical area.' Siding with William Stevens, a former partner with Chi-
cago's Rooks Pitts and Poust, the Illinois court determined that the law firm
violated that state's Code of Professional Conduct by withholding twenty
percent of Stevens's entitlements when he withdrew.26 Thus, Illinois and
Massachusetts have joined Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Tennes-
see, all of which have similarly ruled that such forfeiture for competition
clauses are unenforceable.27
II. Continuation of the Partnership
Perpetuity of the partnership upon the change in the relationship of its
partners is probably the single most important issue for a law firm to address
today. The proper place to address this issue is in the firm's partnership
19. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,411 (N.Y. 1989).
20. 663 P.2d 1285 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
21. See Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 412 (citing Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Or. Ct.
App. 1983)).
22. Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
23. 682N.E.2d 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
24. 687 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. 1997).
25. Stevens v. Rooks Pitts and Poust, 682 N.E.2d 1125, 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997);
Pettingell v. Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, 687 N.E.2d 1237, 1239-40 (Mass. 1997).
26. Stevens, 682N.E.2d at 1132.
27. See Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598,
601-02 (Iowa 1990) (finding forfeiture for withdrawal unenforceable); Jacob v. Norris,
McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 148-49 (N.J. 1992) (finding that restriction on competi-
tion impermissibly restricted practice of law); Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624
N.E.2d 995, 998-1000 (N.Y. 1993) (same); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,410
(N.Y. 1989) (same); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tenn.
1991) (same); see also Stevens, 682 N.E.2d at 1132 (finding noncompetition and withdrawal
provisions invalid); Pettingell, 687 N.E.2d at 1239-40 (same).
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agreement. A successful law firm today must be structured to survive the
withdrawal of a partner.
Although a partnership agreement may state a term of years as its life,
more often than not the agreement has no stated term. According to Section
31 of the Uniform Partnership Act, the voluntary withdrawal of a partner or
withdrawal via death, disability, retirement, or expulsion will terminate the
partnership unless the firm's partnership agreement contains a clause to the
contrary.28 Such a clause should bind the partnership to continue and allow
for the remaining partners to close ranks, reform, and go forward with the
reconstituted firm without the withdrawing partner. Absent a continuation
provision, a partnership may terminate merely by a partner ceasing to carry on
the business of the firm when he withdraws.29 The partnership agreement
should be designed so that the partnership can survive the statutory mandates
of dissolution upon withdrawal, death, and disability. To accomplish this, the
partnership agreement should set forth an undertaking by the remaining
partners that the partnership entity shall continue notwithstanding the exiting
of a certain partner or partners.
1Y Enforceability of the Notice Requirement
Because the withdrawal of a partner can be a traumatic event in the life
of a law firm, the partnership agreement should require a significant notice
period. This period will provide the remaining partners with the time neces-
sary to regroup, to determine whether to continue the partnership, to decide
in what form to continue, and to take steps to protect themselves against the
loss of clients. Adequate notice may also provide the time needed to deter-
mine the cause of the withdrawing partner's unhappiness, if that is the case,
and to make the necessary corrections to retain that partner or to prevent other
partners from also wanting to leave.
The notice provisions in some partnership agreements may provide for
an unusually long period of notice prior to the time when a partner may be
able to withdraw, and the law firm may attempt to hold the departing partner
to that specified period of notice. If the partner were to attempt to leave
before the agreed upon date, the firm might very well claim breach of the
agreement and withhold a portion of the partner's capital from him, as well as
a percentage of other payments to which the withdrawing partner may be
entitled under the agreement. I believe that such clauses are enforceable,
although no case concerning law firms is specifically on point.3" One might
28. UNiF. PARTNERSHIPAcT (1914) § 31 [hereinafter UPA].
29. See id. § 29 (stating that dissolution occurs whenever partner leaves firm).
30. Specified notice provisions can, of course, be shortened. See, e.g., Meehan v.
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argue that if the notice period called for under the agreement is unusually
long, it may violate Rule 5.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-108 regarding
the restriction on the right of an attorney to practice." It is my position,
however, that such notice clauses are enforceable because they ensure clients
that the firm will continue to attend to their matters and will wind up their
matters prior to the time that the partner departs. It also assures the law firn
of the profits on those matters for a sufficient period of time and allows the
firm time to prepare for life after the partner's withdrawal, which could
involve dissolution, lateral hires, or merging with another firm.
As previously discussed, courts have typically maintained that such
notice provisions are enforceable in other professions.32 There is, however,
no case on all fours involving departing attorneys. Recently, in a New York
case cited by Professor Hillman, Willardv. Cowen & Co.,33 the court held that
petitioner Miriam C. Willard, a health care analyst for the investment banking
firm of Cowen & Co. (Cowen) was obligated to remain employed at the firm
for four months after giving notice that she had accepted an offer to work for
a competitor, Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ) 4 Arriving at Cowen the
day after giving notice, the firm barred Willard from entering her office or
gaining access to her files, but still required her to remain at the firm for four
months pursuantto the firm's written partnership agreement.35 Ratherthan do
nothing for 120 days, Willard left and petitioned the court to enjoin Cowen
from taking any action to interfere with her employment at DLJ. 6 She argued
that by employing her only in a technical sense, Cowen was intentionally
keeping her out of the loop so that her skills would get stale.37 Meanwhile,
she filed an arbitration claim with the New York Stock Exchange, claiming
that the lockout annulled the partnership agreement and the notice provision
contained therein.38
Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Mass. 1989) (noting that withdrawing partners chose to
provide less notice than that required in partnership agreement).
31. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 5.6 (1997); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSiBILrY DR 2-108 (1980).
32. See supra note 17 (distinguishing these provisions in other professions).
33. No. 10755/97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 1997).
34. Willard v. Cowen & Co., No. 10755/97, slip op. at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 1997).
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 1.
37. Marcia Vickers, How Tight is the Knot in Partnership Pacts?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
1997, § 3, at9.
38. Willard, No. 10755/97, slip op. at 3.
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Cowen opposed the petition and cross-petitioned for an injunction
prohibiting Willard from the following: working for DLJ, soliciting any
Cowen employees to go there, and refusing to fulfill her duties prior to the
expiration of the 120 day notice period." Cowen also sought a declaratory
judgment declaring that Willard's efforts to resign immediately constituted a
material breach of the notice provisions of the partnership agreement and that
her abrupt departure constituted a breach of her fiduciary duty to the partner-
ship.40
The court noted that Willard tendered her resignation on March 25, 1997
and commenced working for DLJ on March 31, 1997 despite what the court
described as the "plain. language of the Partnership Agreement."'41 Willard
argued that the notice provision was unenforceable as applied to her.42 She
reasoned that the firm effectively stripped her of her partner status by locking
her out of her office.43 This action was "tantamount to termination of the
Partnership Agreement," she continued, and "[c]onsequently, she had no
choice but to commence working with DLJ.""4 Cowen responded that it had
not locked out Willard and that she breached the partnership agreement by
working for DLJ.45
The trial court had to decide whether to grant a preliminary injunction
pending the outcome of arbitration.46 The court deferred Willard's claim that
the notice requirement of the partnership agreement was unenforceable as to
her for final determination by the arbitrator.47 On Cowen's cross-petition that
the notice provision of the partnership agreement was enforceable, the court
held:
The 120 days notice provision in the Partnership Agreement is a crucial
element in the Agreement. There is no question that this provision was
designed to allow Cowen to adjust to the departure of an important partner.
Both parties vouch for the importance of the services of Willard in her
field. Both parties agree that she is ranked among the top three experts in
her field nationwide. This court takes note... that; "the purpose of the
provision in the Partnership Agreement is to give the firm a window of
opportunity to prepare for the departure of a partner." Given this fact,
39. Id. at 1-2.
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id. at 2.





47. Id. at 6-7.
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this... Court concludes that an award to Cowen by an arbitrator "may be
rendered ineffectual without provision[al] relief."48
Accordingly, the court granted the relief sought by Cowen.49 I see no reason
why a court would not apply this same rationale and grant similar relief to a
law firm regarding the enforceability of a specified notice provision.
I agree wholeheartedly with the following four factors enumerated in
Professor Hillman's presentation for evaluating whether a notice is reasonable
or not:
(1) Past practices concerning withdrawals from the firm;
(2) Compliance with notice provisions of partnership agreement;
(3) The possibility of retribution from the firm that may directly or
indirectly harm clients; and
(4) The promptness with which a partner discloses an intent to
withdraw after that intent has been formed.5
I would, however, add two additional factors to the equation:
(5) If the law firm is about to make a material decision or commit-
ment of resources in reliance on the partner's continued mem-
bership in the law firm, that is, hire new practice groups, lease
new space, obtain a line of credit, open a branch office, or pur-
chase office equipment, the partner may be compelled to give
notice.
(6) A partner's position in the firm, that is, whether he or she is
involved in "Management" or is a "Mushroom Partner" (one
who is kept in the dark), are other factors that need to be consid-
ered in evaluating when the actual duty to give notice of with-
drawal arises.
Now that the legal and ethical barriers to a sale of a law firm have been
removed,5 our profession will assuredly see an increased incidence of pur-
chases, sales, and mergers of law practices, as well as more buying and selling
of client matters. Against this backdrop and with law firm breakups and
48. Id. at 7-8 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 8.
50. Hillman, supra note 15, at 1004-05.
51. See Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 593 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that "the
ethical constraints against the sale of a law practice's goodwill by a practicing attorney no
longer warrant a blanket prohibition against the valuation of law firm goodwill when those
ethical concerns are absent"). Prior to the Dawson decision, the four Appellate Divisions ofthe
State of New York had adopted DR 2-111 ("Sale of Law Practice"). See Edward A. Adams,
State Allows Sale of Law Practice, N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1996, at 1, 7. In so doing, New York
joined a dozen other states that allow for the sale of a law practice and that have modeled their
statutes on Rule 1.17 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 1.
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lateral partner hirings and departures now commonplace, the New York Court
of Appeals has fortunately provided some broad parameters for attorneys
soliciting clients before departing from their law firms. In July 1995, in
GraubardMollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz,52 the New York Court of
Appeals ruled that attorneys owe a fiduciary duty to their clients before
leaving their firms. 3 The Graubard decision, together with the decision in
Cohen concluding that forfeiture for competition clauses are unenforceable
because they restrict the right of attorneys to practice54 and the decision in
Dawson v. White & Case,55 in which the court ruled that goodwill was a
distributable asset of a law firm,56 offers a general view of what New York
Chief Judge Judith Kaye has termed "a modern day law firm fixture; the
revolving door."57
Chief Judge Kaye's statement, probably more than any other, establishes
why partner withdrawal is such an important issue. Amidst charges and
countercharges of faithless, deserting partners and a vindictive abandoned
firm, the key question in Graubard became whether departing partners could
solicit the clients of the firm. 8 A unanimous court ruled that the plaintiff law
firm's allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and fraud
were sufficient to withstand summary dismissal - the same conclusion
reached by the trial and the intermediate courts. 9
V. Solicitation of Clients and Tortious Interference with Firm Clients
When partners move laterally from one law firm to another, issues
usually arise as to the exact point in the process when a departing partner may
contact clients about changing law firms. With rare exception, a client
retaining the services of a law firm is hiring the firm to represent him, with the
understanding that client matters may be handled by one or more partners.
Accordingly, deciding who will continue to represent a firm's clients is
perhaps the most difficult and volatile aspect of a partner's withdrawal.
Starting with the proposition that before leaving their firms, attorneys owe
a fiduciary duty to their clients, the New York Court of Appeals in Graubard
52. 653 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1995).
53. Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1182-83
(N.Y. 1995).
54. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 410 (N.Y. 1989).
55. 672 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1996).
56. Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (N.Y. 1996).
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examined the "spectrum" of permissible and impermissible acts with respect
to client solicitation by withdrawing partners." According to the court:
At one end of the spectrum... departing partners have been permitted
to inform firm clients with whom they have a prior professional relation-
ship about their impending withdrawal and new practice, and to remind the
client of its freedom to retain counsel of its choice .... Ideally, such
approaches would take place only after notice to the firm of the partner's
plans to leave ....
At the other end of the spectrum, secretly attempting to lure firm clients
(even those the partner has brought into the firm and personally repre-
sented) to the new association, lying to clients about their rights with
respect to the choice of counsel, lying to partners about plans to leave, and
abandoning the firm on short notice (taking clients and files) would not be
consistent with a partner's fiduciary duties .... "
As should be self-evident, these standards are intended primarily to
protect clients. In my experience, the courts will always protect the client.
The client always comes first. If you find yourself in a situation concerning
a client and the solution is unclear, you should determine the answer by asking
yourself, "What is best for the client?" A departing partner has a fiduciary
responsibility and a duty to be open and honest with the partnership. Failure
to meet those requirements can have dire economic consequences for the
departing partner. 2 In Meehan v. Shaughnessy,63 on several occasions,
partners in a successful Boston litigation firm confronted two partners who
planned to leave about their plans, and the two partners denied that they were
leaving.' Surreptitiously, these same partners notified the firm's clients,
obtained consent to have certain matters transferred, and otherwise acted in
their own self-interest in order to gain an unfair advantage. 5 The court held
that the departing partners breached their fiduciary duties to their partners.66
Provisions in the firm's partnership agreement provided withdrawing partners
the benefits of all fees generated on matters taken with them. 7 When calcu-
lating damages, however, the Meehan court ordered the departed partners to
pay to the law firm the fees generated on matters they took with them, unless
they could prove that the clients would have left without the unfair tactics.
60. Id. at 1183-84.
61. Id.
62. See Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1265-67 (Mass. 1989).
63. 535 N.E.2d 1255,(Mass. 1989).
64. Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Mass. 1989).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1264.
67. Id. at 1261.
68. Id. at 1267.
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In my experience, courts will not tolerate the breach of a withdrawing
partner's fiduciary responsibility to be open and honest with the law firm
partnership. A partner who denies that he is leaving the firm, while surrepti-
tiously arranging to have the firm's clients consent to transfer their matters to
a new firm, is a partner acting in his own self-interest in order to gain an
unfair advantage.69 Even when the partnership agreement allows a withdraw-
ing partner to receive the benefit of all fees generated on matters taken with
him, the withdrawing partner should repay all fees generated on these matters,
unless he can prove that the clients would have switched firms in the absence
of his unfair tactics. 0
To protect clients and to avoid a breach of fiduciary duty by the departing
partner, the partnership agreement should provide that upon the withdrawal
of a partner, the partnership and the partners agree on the contents of a joint
letter to the clients. The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility has drafted an informal opinion setting forth the ethical standards for
attorneys announcing a change in professional association and providing the
following guidelines for notice to clients:
(a) the notice is mailed; (b) the notice is sent only to persons with
whom the lawyer had an active lawyer-client relationship immediately
before the change in the lawyer's professional association; (c) the notice
is clearly related to open and pending matters of which the lawyer had
direct professional responsibility to the client immediately before the
change; (d) the notice is sent promptly after the change; (e) the notice does
not urge the client to sever a relationship with the lawyer's former firm and
does not recommend the lawyer's employment (although it indicates the
lawyer's willingness to continue responsibility for the matters); (f) the
notice makes it clear that the client has the right to decide who will com-
plete or continue the matters; and (g) the notice is brief, dignified, and not
disparaging of the lawyer's former firm.
71
VI. Access to Client Files and Confidential Information by a
Withdrawing Partner
Generally, when a client retains an attorney who is a partner in a law
firm, the presumption is that the client has retained the firm as a whole, unless
there is an agreement to the contrary.7' Usually, a retainer agreement with the
client establishes this fact.
69. See id. at 1263 (stating that partners may not act in their own self-interest).
70. See id. at 1267 (placing burden of proof on party improperly removing clients before
fees may be kept pursuant to partnership agreement).
71. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1466
(1981) (extending Informal Opinion 1457 to departing associates as well as to partners).
72. Burton v. Estrada, 501 N.E.2d 254, 259 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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A client's files are the property of the law firm,73 at least until the client
directs to the contrary. When the client directs, the client's files must be
turned over to a successor firm in an orderly and professional manner.74 Until
the firm receives that instruction, however, the client remains a client of the
firm, and the client's files properly remain in the partnership's possession
with the attorneys of record.
Although these issues are complex, the consideration of ethics and
fiduciary and agency principles during the drafting of an appropriate clause
in a partnership agreement may address these issues. A partnership agreement
may provide that a withdrawing partner is not entitled to take or have access
to client files without the client's permission. If the departing partner pos-
sesses the files before receiving that permission, he will have breached the
partnership agreement.
VII. The Withdrawing Partner's Interests in Unfinished Assignments
Without a specific provision in the partnership agreement, a departing
partner may find that the fees generated from client matters that he takes with
him belong to his prior law firm, regardless of the fact that he originated the
business for the prior firm and performed substantial work on these matters
long after his withdrawal.75 Without a provision in the partnership agreement
as guidance, the courts will look to the fiduciary responsibilities of both the
withdrawing partner and of the firm. The court will then allocate the post-
departure work in a manner that levels the playing field between the with-
drawing attorney and the firm.76 This rule applies whether the law firm is a
73. See Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly, Davis & Dicus, 824 S.W.2d 92, 95
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that client possesses right of access to file and that firm retains
ownership); Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz& Mendelsohn, LLP, 689 N.E.2d 879,
882-83 (N.Y. 1997) (finding that client was entitled to inspect and copy client's file).
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58(3) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996) (mandating that attorneys deliver client files once representation is termi-
nated).
75. See Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding that absent
agreement provisions to contrary, court may allocate income to former partners according to
their percentage interest in partnership).
76. See Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1269-70 (Mass. 1989) (setting forth
method to allocate cases properly removed and those improperly removed between withdrawing
partners and firm); see also Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20 (allocating post-dissolution income
in absence of partnership agreement in accordance with interests in former partnership);
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 192 (Ct. App. 1983) (finding that
duty of loyalty forbids withdrawing partner from removing unfinished business that existed
during term of partnership for his own benefit); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d 413, 417 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (stating that contingency cases taken by partner after law firm dissolved were
unfinished law firm business and belonged to partnership in dissolution).
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partnership or a professional corporation.77
In a seminal case, Jewel v. Boxer," a partnership of four attorneys split
into two separate, new partnerships, and the court ordered that the firm divide
the fees generated from clients prior to the dissolution according to the part-
ners' respective interests in the original partnership.79 In reaching its decision,
the court relied heavily on the sound reasoning applied in Rosenfeld, Meyer
& Susman v. Cohen,8" another California case.8 ' The approach in Jewel and
Rosenfeld "prevents partners from competing for the most remunerative cases
during the life of the partnership in anticipation that they might retain these
cases should the partnership dissolve." 2 Partners are free to include provi-
sions in their partnership agreements regarding the completion of unfinished
business, and the courts encourage them to do so because "[tihe absence of a
written partnership agreement [is] an invitation to litigation upon [a] dissolu-
tion of a partnership."83 Allowing a partner to retain post-dissolution fees
following a bad faith withdrawal would reward him for such conduct. The
holdings of Jewel and its progeny discourage partners from absconding with
files in the middle of the night and from profiting from unscrupulous
behavior.84
Two fairly recent decisions have had far-reaching effects by clearly
establishing that law firms must honor their fiduciary obligations, as well as
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract, in deal-
ing with and fixing the compensation of withdrawing partners.8 In Stuart v.
Lane & Mittendorf,"6 the court precluded the law firm of Lane & Mittendorf
from hiding behind a subjective decision-making process when artificially
deflating a withdrawing partner's compensation while simultaneously improp-
77. See Fox v. Abrams, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (Ct. App. 1985).
78. 203 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Ct. App. 1984).
79. Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19-20 (Ct. App. 1984).
80. 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Ct. App. 1983).
81. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 15.
84. See id. at 19-20 (requiring distributions based on interest in former partnership). For
further guidance on this topic, see generally Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 672 N.E.2d 854
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989). The Dowdcourt
prohibited various pre-notice actions that the Meehan court specifically approved. Compare
Dowd, 672 N.E.2d at 862-63 with Meehan, 535 N.E.2d at 1263-64.
85. Starrv. Fordham, 648N.E.2d 1261, 1265-67 (Mass. 1995); Smithy. Brown&Jones,
633 N.Y.S.2d 436, 442 (Sup. Ct. 1995), afld sub nom. Stuart v. Lane & Mittendorf, 652
N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. Div. 1997).
86. 633 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 1995), aff'dsub nom. Stuart v. Lane & Mittendorf, 652
N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. Div. 1997).
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erly boosting the compensation of the remaining partners.87 The decision
mandates that, although a partnership agreement may allow the partnership to
fix retrospectively compensation for a withdrawing partner, an unfair alloca-
tion of profits to a withdrawing partner will constitute self-dealing and will
not be tolerated.88 The court based its decision on the law firm's fiduciary
obligations and the requirement that it must deal fairly and equitably with
partners.89 The court found that the law firm breached its fiduciary obligation
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the withdrawing
partner by unfairly determining his compensation for the year when he with-
drew as a partner.' It awarded the departing partner a substantial money
judgment." The court supported its decision to award damages with the deter-
mination in Starr v. Fordham.
VIII. Conclusion
For my last observation, I would like to stress the critical importance of
a carefully considered and well-crafted written partnership agreement that
addresses the withdrawal of partners. Time after time, I have found that
courts will construe strictly law firm partnership agreements and will continue
to hold attorneys and law firms to their precise provisions.93 Three recently
decided cases have conclusively upheld the sanctity of a law firm's written
partnership agreement. 4
87. See Smith, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 441 (finding it improper to recharacterize withdrawing
partner's client to deny that partner fees).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 441-42.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 442.
92. See Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1265-67 (Mass. 1995) (binding partners to
duties of good faith and fair dealing when allocating profits to withdrawing partner).
93. Generally, courts will not disturb a partnership agreement in the absence of extenuat-
ing circumstances. See Spayd v. Turner, Granzow & Hollenkamp, 482 N.E.2d 1232, 1240
(Ohio 1985) ("A partnership agreement will generally not be disturbed by the courts in the
absence of extenuating circumstances."); Blount v. Smith, 231 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ohio 1967)
(finding presumption that contract was executed without misunderstanding or imposition).
94. See Bama, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd. v. Beens, 541 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (deciding that provision for withdrawing partners in written partnership agreement
mandating 50% split of contingency cases does notviolate law against forfeiture for competition
clauses); Schrempp and Salerno v. Gross, 529N.W.2d 764, 770-71 (Neb. 1995) (finding breach
of contract when withdrawing partner violated partnership agreement regarding division of fees
on pending matters); Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 592 (N.Y. 1996) (finding that
no goodwill is distributable as asset to departing partner because partnership agreement states
that goodwill has no value for asset valuation purposes).
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When assessing whether withdrawing partners have fulfilled their duties
to the firm, review your own law firm's partnership agreement and ask your-
self the following three questions: (1) Has the withdrawing partner violated
any provisions of the firm's partnership agreement - that is, proper notice?;
(2) Has the withdrawing partner complied with his or her fiduciary duties in
anticipation of withdrawal?; and (3) Have client interests been compromised?
The answer to these questions and the precedents Professor Hillman and I
have discussed will hopefully serve as a warning of the hazaids that law firms
and withdrawing partners may face when partners withdraw or are expelled.
They should help partners to complete a self-examination of their own law
firm's partnership agreement to see if it addresses the issues posed by these
cases. Additionally, partners must admonish strict compliance with the proce-
dures set forth in those written agreements - no matter who shows whom to
the door.
